Effective model theory studies model theoretic notions with an eye towards issues of computability and effectiveness. We consider two possible starting points. If the basic objects are taken to be theories, then the appropriate effective version investigates decidable theories (the set of theorems is computable) and decidable structures (ones with decidable theories). If the objects of initial interest are typical mathematical structures, then the starting point is computable structures. We present an introduction to both of these aspects of effective model theory organized roughly around the themes of the number and types of models of theories with particular attention to categoricity (as either a hypothesis or a conclusion) and the analysis of various computability issues in families of models.
Basic Notions
The lectures on which this paper is based were intended to be a brief introduction to effective model theory centered around one set of issues: the number of models of specified type and, in particular, the notion of categoricity. For more general introductions we refer the reader to The Handbook of Recursive Algebra ), especially the articles by Harizanov [1998] and . This Handbook also contains other useful survey papers on aspects of effective model theory and algebra and an extensive bibliography. The one most closely related to the theme of this paper is Goncharov [1998] . Another interesting survey is Millar [1999] in The Handbook of Computability Theory (Griffor [1999] ). Two books in progress on the subject are Ash and Knight [1999] and Harizanov [2000] . These are all good sources for material and references. An extensive and very useful bibliography prepared by I. Kalantari [1998] can also be found in .
One might well begin with the question of what effective model theory is about. Of course, it is about investigating the subjects of model theory with an eye to questions of effectiveness. What then is model theory about and what does one mean by effectiveness? As for model theory we simply quote from two standard texts (to which we also refer the reader for the terminology, notation and results of classical model theory). Chang and Keisler [1990] say "Model theory is the branch of mathematical logic which deals with the connection between a formal language and its interpretations, or models." Hodges [1993] says "Model theory is the study of the construction and classification of structures within specified classes of structures." We can take these two definitions as expressing two views of the proper subject of model theory. The first starts with formal languages and so we may say with theories. (We take a theory T to be simply a set of sentences in some (first-order) language L, called the language of T. We say that a theory T is complete if T` or T`: for every sentence of L.) The second starts with mathematical structures. One might think of these views as, respectively, logical and algebraic. They lead to a basic dichotomy in the approach to effective model theory. Should we "effectivize" theories or structures. Of course, the answer is that we should investigate both approaches and their interconnections. As for what one means by "effectiveness," there are many notions ranging from ones in computer science to ones of descriptive set theory that have some claim to being versions of effectiveness. Most, if not all, of them can be reasonably called in to analyze different model theoretic questions. In this paper, we limit ourselves to what we view as the primary notion of effectiveness: Turing computability (or, equivalently, recursiveness). Thus we are lead to formal definitions of the two basic notions of our subject, effective theories and structures. Definition 1.1 A theory T is decidable if the theorems of T form a computable set. A structure A (for a language L) with underlying set (or domain) A is decidable if Th(A; a) a2A , the complete (or elementary) diagram of A, i.e. the set of all sentences (with constant symbols for each element of A) true in A, is computable. A is computable if D(A; a) a2A , the (atomic) diagram of A, i.e. the set of all atomic sentences or their negations (again with constant symbols for each element of A) true in A, is computable.
The Effective Completeness Theorem
A common theme in model theory is the investigation of questions about when given theories have models with specified properties. Typical examples include characterizing when theories have atomic, prime, universal, homogeneous or saturated models. Other questions involve models of various ranks or dimension, with or without indiscernibles or even more ambitiously attempts to characterize all the models of a given theory. In effective model theory one naturally wants to know when theories have decidable or computable models of each type or even to attempt to characterize the decidable or computable models of a given theory. We will investigate a few examples of such questions. We begin with the issue of when a theory has a model at all -Gödel's completeness theorem.
Theorem 2.1 (Completeness Theorem) If a theory T is consistent it has a model.
We present one effective analog of the completeness theorem for decidable theories with a proof modeled on Henkin's proof of the classical completeness theorem. This method of construction is simple but basic for many results in both classical and effective model theory and we will see several variants latter on.
Theorem 2.2 (Effective Completeness Theorem) If a theory T is consistent and decidable then it has a decidable model.
Proof. We assume that the classical Henkin construction is known and so provide only a sketch so that we can check its effective content. Let L c be the language L of T extended by infinitely many new constants c i and let e be a (computable) list of the sentences of L c . We construct an increasing sequence of finite sets s of sentences of L c (with^ s = s ) consistent with T with union as in the Henkin proof of the completeness theorem. We need to satisfy the requirements P e for each e 2 N: P e : e 2 or : e 2 and if e is of the form 9x (x) and in then (c i ) 2
for some i.
Construction:
At stage s ask if s is consistent with T s . If so put s into s+1 and, if s is 9x (x), also put (c i ) into s+1 for some as yet unmentioned c i . If s is not consistent with T s put : s into s+1 .
Verifications:
Obviously, is complete and the standard argument shows that it is consistent. As usual the elements of the desired model M are the equivalence classes of the c i under the equivalence relation given by c i c j iff (c i = c j ) 2 and the relations and functions on M are determined in the natural way by the formulas in .
The only issue for us now is the effectiveness of the construction. First we note that one can verify that if T is decidable then is computable. The only question we must answer at stage s is if s is inconsistent with T s . This is equivalent to whether or not s ! : s (with new free variables z i substituted in for the constants c i appearing in s or s ) is a theorem of T. As T is decidable the answer to these questions is a computable function of s. Thus the equivalence relation c i c j is computable. (Just look at s+1 where c i = c j is s .) So the equivalence classes form a computable set (the domain of M) and the relations and functions on M are determined by . Indeed, as usual, a sentence is true in M if and only if 2 and so M is decidable as required.
One theme in effective model theory that we will not pursue investigates the question of how hard it is (say in terms of Turing degree or levels of the (hyper)arithmetic hierarchy) to construct models of a given type when it is not possible to produce decidable or even computable ones. We consider the completeness theorem as our only example. In the construction above the only noneffective step was deciding if s is consistent with T s . As one can always answer this question computably in T 0 (the Turing jump of T), every consistent theory T has a model computable, indeed decidable, in T 0 . Proof. The first assertion follows immediately from the construction and discussion above. For the second, instead of a single we build a binary tree (of choices of s (and Henkin axioms as appropriate) or : s ). We terminate any path that becomes inconsistent when we find a proof of inconsistency from T. This produces an infinite binary tree computable in T (the particular constructed above is an infinite path through this tree). The low basis theorem (Jockusch and Soare [1972] ) says that there is an infinite path P through the tree with P 0 T T 0 . As above we can construct the desired model (and its complete diagram) computably in P as required.
For the sake of convenience we assume from now on that all theories are consistent.
We can now say (in some sense) when a theory T has a decidable model.
Corollary 2.4 A complete theory T has a decidable model if and only if it is decidable. An arbitrary theory T has a decidable model if and only if it has a decidable complete extension.
Proof. If M is a model of T and T is complete then the set of theorems of T is simply the intersection of Th(M; m) m2M with the sentences of the language L of T and so T is decidable if M is decidable. Even if T is not complete, if M is a decidable model of T then this set is a decidable complete extension of T. The other (if) direction of both assertions in the Corollary follow from Theorem 2.2.
We will not in general assume that theories are complete. However, finite models have little interest from the viewpoint of Turing computability.
We assume from now on that all theories have only infinite models. Now that we "know" when a theory T has a decidable model, we might well ask how many decidable models a theory can have. For now we identify models up to classical isomorphisms and so we might better ask how many decidably presentable models can a theory have. The issues of identifying computable models only when there is a computable isomorphism between them will be taken up in §6-7.
If T is incomplete then every decidable complete extension has a decidable model by Theorem 2.2 and, of course, models of distinct extensions are not isomorphic. Moreover, every decidable model of T is a model of some complete decidable extension of T. Thus if one is interested in the number of decidably presentable models of a theory, it suffices to consider only complete decidable the-ories. We begin with the possibility that there is only one as in our example DeLO of a decidable @ 0 -categorical theory. Proposition 2.5 If a theory T is @ 0 -categorical then the following conditions are equivalent:
T has a decidable model. 3. All models of T are decidably presentable.
Proof. As @ 0 -categoricity implies completeness, the equivalences all follow directly from the hypothesis, definitions and Theorem 2.2. Now, it is a remarkable classical theorem due to Vaught [1961] that no complete theory has exactly two (isomorphism types of) models. The effective analog for decidable models is, however, false. Theorem 2.6 (Millar [1979] , Kudaibergenov [1979] ) There is a decidable theory T with exactly two (isomorphism types of) decidably presentable models.
Proof sketch. Let f be a partial computable function whose range is f0;1g and which does not have a total computable extension. Consider the (computably enumerable but computably inseparable) sets M 0 = fxjf(x) = 0g and M 1 = fxjf(x) = 1g. Let f 0 f 1 : : : be an effective approximation to f such that k = 2 dom(f s ) for all k > s.
The language of T contains infinitely many unary and binary predicates P i and R i , respectively, where i 2 !. Consider first the theory T 0 whose axioms are the following set of statements:
1. 8xP 0 (x)&8y(P i+1 (y) ! P i (y)), where i 2 !. 2. If R k (x; y), then x 6 = y and P k (x)&P k (y). 3. If x 6 = y, P s (x)&P s (y) and f s (k) = 0, then R k (x; y). 4. If x 6 = y, P s (x)&P s (y) and f s (k) = 1, then :R k (x; y).
One can check that the following four properties hold of T 0 : 1. T 0 has a decidable model completion T. Moreover T has a unique 1-type (Definition 3.1) p such that P k (z) 2 p for all k 2 !. 2. If a model A of T has at least two elements realizing p, then A is not decidably presentable.
3. If a model A of T has fewer than two elements realizing p, then A is decidably presentable.
4. If A 1 and A 2 are models of T with the same finite number of elements realizing p, then A 1 and A 2 are isomorphic.
These properties show that T has exactly two decidably presentable models.
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The above proof can easily be generalized:
Corollary 2.7 For each n !, there exists a theory with exactly n nonisomorphic decidable models.
As for our examples above, an analysis of the structure of models of DiLO as in Chang and Keisler [1990, 3.4] easily implies that there are countably many distinct decidable models. The same is true for ACF 0 as we shall see in Theorem 5.2. Although the natural effective version of Vaught's theorem fails, the proof (properly effectivized) can be used to give a similar result for decidable models (Theorem 4.4 below). We first need to study another aspect of the question of how many decidable models a theory T can have: When are each of the classically studied types of models such as prime, atomic or saturated models of a decidable theory decidably presentable?
Decidable Prime Models
We begin our study of specific types of models with prime and atomic models. They will play a crucial role in the next two sections.
Definition 3.1 An n-type ? or ?(x 1 ; : : :; x n ) of a theory T is a set of formulas with n free variables in the language of T which is consistent with T such that (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) or : (x 1 ; : : :; x n ) belongs to ? for each such formula. An n-type ?(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) of a theory T is principal if there is a formula (x 1 ; : : :; x n ) such that T` (x 1 ; : : :; x n ) ! (x 1 ; : : :; x n ) for every 2 ?. In this case we say that (x 1 ; : : :; x n ) is a complete formula that generates ?. The notions of prime and atomic coincide for countable models and so we motivate our characterization of decidable prime models by two classical characterizations. As the notions of atomic and prime coincide (for countable models), each of these theorems provides a characterization of the theories with prime models. We now consider what might be the appropriate effective versions of these theorems.
In one direction, note that every type realized in a prime model of T is principal and all principal types are realized in every model of T. Thus, if T has a decidable prime model, not only is every formula consistent with T a member of a principal type (and so completable) but there is a uniformly computable list of these principal types given by the ones realized in the decidable prime model.
The classical theorems at first glance suggest that this condition might be sufficient. We should use this list of computable types to construct the model. However, an additional possible uniformity is suggested by each classical characterization. The characterization of prime models suggests that we might need to be able to go uniformly effectively from formulas to (indices for) principal types containing them. The characterization of atomic models suggests that one might need to be able to go uniformly effectively from formulas to generating formulas for the principal types containing them. Although the two classical versions are equivalent these two effective versions are not. The first is clearly necessary as given a formula consistent with T and a decidable prime model A we can computably find an n-tuple of elements of A satisfying . The set of formulas satisfied by this n-tuple A is then a computable principal type containing . It turns out that this condition is also sufficient. The second condition clearly implies the first and so is sufficient but not, as it turns out, necessary.
Theorem 3.5 (Harrington [1974] ; Goncharov and Nurtazin [1973] Suppose then that T has a prime model and the set of principal types of T is uniformly computable. As T has a prime model, every formula is a member of a principal type and so the search among those in the given set for one containing terminates and provides the computable function required in the theorem.
The effective uniformity in the listing of the computable principal types is necessary as an explicit hypothesis: Theorem 3.7 (Millar[1978] Finally, we show that the possible alternate version of Theorem 3.5 that asks for a computable way to go from a formula to a completion is false and so "uniformly atomic" is stronger than "uniformly prime" even for decidable @ 1 -categorical theories. Proof. The language of T has infinitely many unary predicates R i . The axioms of T say that the cardinality of each R i is exactly 2 and that R i and R j are disjoint for distinct i and j except for some designated triples hi;j;ki such that R k consists of one element from each of R i and R j : Moreover, no two distinct designated triples have any entry in common. The actual list of axioms for T is thus determined by the list of designated triples. This list will be defined recursively to diagonalize against each possible computable partial function e which might be a candidate for a function taking formulas to complete extensions. Thus T will be axiomati- The characterization of decidable theories with decidable saturated models is somewhat easier than for prime ones. Theorem 4.2 (Morley [1976] , Millar [1978] , Goncharov [1978a] Proof sketch. If T has a decidable saturated model A then the types of T are uniformly computable as we can simply list the n-tuples from A and, for each of them the set of formulas it satisfies. For the other direction, we can use the uniformly computable list of types to do an effective Henkin construction. As the construction proceeds, we designate new constants to realize each potential type over previously introduced constants. As all the potential types over new constants are given uniformly computably as restrictions to a subset of their free variable of ones on our given list this procedure can be effectively organized. Roughly speaking, the plan is to continue to make the designated constants realize the appropriate type until an inconsistency is reached. We can check for inconsistencies with previously assigned types since they are all uniformly computable. We use a priority ordering to guarantee that, despite the need to cancel attempts at realizing certain potential types, each actual type over the constants introduced is in fact realized. Thus the model constructed is saturated as required.
Saturated Models and the Number of Decidable Models
By Millar [1978] , the explicit assumption of uniformity is necessary even if one assumes that the decidable theory T has a saturated model and all its types are computable. Millar [1978, p. 63] suggests that the proof of this results can be modified to show that there is no connection between the decidability of the saturated and prime models (when both exist). We now show that, in fact, if there is a decidable saturated model then there is a decidable prime model. (Ershov [1980, 381-382] , see also Goncharov [1997, Theorem 3.4.4] ) If a complete theory T has a decidable saturated model then it has a decidable prime model.
Proposition 4.3

Proof.
As T has a decidable model it is itself decidable by Corollary 2.4. As it has a decidable saturated model, Theorem 4.2 gives us a uniformly computable list ? e of all the types of T. By Theorem 3.5, it suffices to prove that, given any formula consistent with T, we can go effectively to a principal type ? containing . We begin with the first type ? n 0 on our list containing = 0 . We proceed recursively to extend to i and define a type ? n i containing i . Given i , ? n i and i (from the list of all formulas with the same number of free variables as ), we ask if both i and : i are consistent with T f i g. If not, i+1 = i and n i+1 = n i . If so, we find the first e 0 and e 1 such that i^ i 2 ? e 0 and i^: i 2 ? e 1 , respectively. We let n i+1 be the larger of e 0 and e 1 and let i+1 be i^ i or i^: i accordingly. It is clear that the sequence n i is nondecreasing as at step i of the construction if e 0 and e 1 are defined then one of them is n i and we always take the larger. As this procedure is effective, f i ji 2 !g generates a computable type ? containing . If n i is not eventually constant, ? would be a type of T not equal to any ? e for a contradiction. Once n i has stabilized say at n we can define e 0 and e 1 at only finitely many stages s as each time we do so we extend s and eliminate one possible ? j for j < n from future consideration. Thus i also eventually stabilizes say at e . It is now clear that e generates the type ? n which is therefore the required principal type containing .
We now see what the proof of Vaught's theorem that a complete theory cannot have exactly two models gives us.
Corollary 4.4 If a complete but not @ 0 -categorical theory T has a decidable saturated model then it has at least three decidable models.
Proof. Let A be a decidable saturated model of T. By Proposition 4.3, T has a decidable prime model B. As T is not @ 0 -categorical, the decidable saturated model A of T is not a prime model and so A and B are not isomorphic. Thus A realizes a nonprincipal (but computable) type ?(x). A can clearly be expanded to a saturated model of T ?(c) by properly interpreting the constants c and so T ?(c) has a decidable saturated model and hence a decidable prime model C by Proposition 4.3. Of course, the restriction of C is a decidable model of T. As in the proof of Vaught's theorem (as in Chang and Keisler [1990, Theorem 2.3 .15]), this model cannot be isomorphic to either A or B.
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On the other hand, if a decidable theory T has no decidable prime model (and so no decidable saturated model) then it has infinitely many decidable prime models. To see this, we quote a simple case of Millar's effective omitting types theorem.
Theorem 4.5 (Millar [1983] Thus, in particular, T can have only countably many types. This condition is not sufficient and the problem remains open in general. There are a couple of partial answers. The answer is simple for @ 0 -categorical theories and is supplied by Proposition 2.5. The nicest result is for @ 1 -categorical theories to which we now turn.
5.
@ 1 -Categorical Theories
If a theory T is @ 1 -categorical (and so complete) but not @ 0 -categorical then The general problem we wish to address is the following:
Question 5.1 If T is @ 1 but not @ 0 -categorical theory when (and which of) its models are decidably or computably presentable?
Decidable Models of @ 1 -Categorical Theories
Of course, if T is @ 1 -categorical and so complete, it has a decidable model if and only if it is itself decidable (Theorem 2.4). Actually, the decidability of T is enough to guarantee that every model is decidably presentable:
Theorem 5.2 (Harrington[1974] , Khisamiev [1974] ) If T is @ 1 -categorical and decidable then every model of T is decidably presentable.
Proof. We first use the results of Baldwin and Lachlan [1971] to show that we can reduce the problem to that of the existence of decidable prime models for a decidable theory T. (All the model theoretic facts we cite in this proof can be found in Baldwin and Lachlan [1971] .)
As T is @ 1 -categorical, there is a principal n-type ?(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) such that T 0 = T ?(c 1 ; : : :; c n ) (with c i new constants) has a strongly minimal formula, i.e. a formula (x) of L 0 (the language L of T expanded by new constants c i )
such that for every model A of T 0 and every formula (x) of L 0 , exactly one of fa 2 AjA j = (a)^ (a)g and fa 2 AjA j = (a)^: (a)g is finite. Of course, T 0 is @ 1 -categorical. Note that as T is decidable and ? is principal, T 0 is also decidable (T 0` , 2 ? , T` ! where is a generator of ?). As all models of T can be extended to ones of T 0 , we can assume for the proof of our theorem that T has a strongly minimal formula .
Now each model of an @ 1 -categorical theory T with a strongly minimal formula is the prime model of an extension T 0 of T by constants d i satisfying a type which says that (d i ) holds for each i and that the d i are algebraically independent, i.e. there is no formula (x; y) 2 such that for some n, 9 n x( (x)^ (x; y)) 2 . (In fact, the cardinality of the set of d i is the dimension of the model and uniquely determines it.) Again T 0 is clearly @ 1 -categorical. We must verify that it is also decidable, i.e. is computable. We prove by induction on the number n of d i that the corresponding types n and theories T n = T n (d 1 ; : : : ; d n ) are uniformly decidable. 
As T n is decidable, we can search for and find such an m for or : . The other is in , i.e. if T n`9 m x( (x)^ (x; d)) then : (x; d) 2 and if T n`9 m x( (x)^: (x; d)) then (x; d) 2 . Thus each T n and T 1 = T n is decidable and the models of T are precisely the prime models of these theories. To prove our theorem it therefore suffices to show that each of these theories has a decidable prime model.
By Theorem 3.5, it suffices to show that if T is a decidable @ 1 -categorical theory with a strongly minimal formula then there is a computable function taking any formula (x) to a computable principal type ? containing . Given , we construct a computable type ? in stages e by starting with and adding on each e in turn if it is consistent with what we have put in ? so far and, if e is 9y( (y)^ (y; x)), we also add in 9y( (y)^ (y; x)^ (y)) for some algebraic , i.e. one such that T`9 n y( (y)^ (y)) for some n 2 !. Of course, if e is not consistent with what we have so far we add on : e . The point here is that if 9y( (y)^ (y; x)) is consistent with what we have so far then the formula gotten by adding it on is realized in the prime model of T say by c. Now that model has only algebraic realizations of and so whatever element witnessed 9y( (y)^ (y; c)) is algebraic and so also satisfies some algebraic formula . Thus 9y( (y)^ (y; x)^ (y)) can be consistently added on as desired.
We claim that ? is principal and so the required ? . Consider the prime model A of T ?(c) and any a 2 A such that A j = (a). As A is a prime model of T ?(c), a realizes a principal type over T ?(c) generated say by (y; c).
If a is not algebraic then for every formula and every n 2 !, T ?(c)` (y; c) ! (y) ! :9 n y( (y)^ (y))]. On the other hand, as A j = (a)^ (a; c), 9y( (y)^ (y; x)) 2 ? and so by construction 9y( (y)^ (y; x)^ (y)) 2
? for some such that T`9 n y( (y)^ (y)) for some n for a contradiction.
Thus A has only algebraic solutions of , i.e. it is the model of dimension 0, and so A is actually the prime model of T. As ? is realized in A, it must be principal over T as required.
(This last argument is attributed to Lachlan in Harrington [1974] . Harrington' s own proof is also instructive. It begins with the observation that the function taking a formula to its rank as defined in Baldwin [1973] can be seen to be a computable map from formulas into N by the arguments presented in that paper. Thus, given a formula consistent with T, we may computably define a type ? = ? e containing by putting in, for each e in turn, either e or : e so as to always preserve consistency and to reduce the rank of V ? e if possible. Eventually, the rank must stabilize and so we produce a principal type ? containing .)
Computable Models
We now turn to the question of which models of an @ 1 -categorical but not @ 0 -categorical theory T are computably presentable if T is not decidable. It is easy to find such a theory with no computable models by coding a noncomputable set S into every model. (For example, extend ACF 0 by adding on new unary predicates P i and, for each i 2 !, axioms 8x(P i (x) ! x = 0) and P i (0) if i 2 S but :P i (0) if i = 2 S.) Thus the question is, if T has a computable but no decidable model, which of the models A i of T can or cannot be computable. Only a few facts are known.
Theorem 5.3 , Kudaibergenov [1980] ) For every n 2 N there is an @ 1 -categorical but not @ 0 -categorical theory T such that A 0 ; : : :; A n are all computably presentable but not A i for i > n. Proof. Fix n 2 N. The language for the required theory T will consist of a unary predicate P k and an n-ary predicate R k for each k 2 N. The axioms for T will code a computably enumerable but not computable set B = B s into each model of dimension greater than n while maintaining the possibility that the models of dimension less than or equal to n are computably presentable.
Axioms:
The P k are nested downward with respect to k and exactly one element drops out at each k, i.e. for each k 2 N we have the following axioms:
For each k 2 N we wish to require that R k (x 1 ; : : :; x n ) ,^fx i 6 = x j ji 6 = jg^9s(k 2 B s^x1 ; : : :; x n 2 P s ).
We enforce this requirement by the following axioms:
*R k (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) ! x i 6 = x j for i 6 = j. *For each s 2 N and k 2 B s : V fx i 6 = x j ji 6 = jg^x 1 ; : : : ; x n 2 P s ! R k (x 1 ; : : :; x n ). For the other direction, we wish to construct a computable model A of T with m < n many elements c 1 ; : : : ; c m , in \P A s . We let the other elements of the desired model be the natural numbers and we put i in P k if and only if i k. We now only have to computably define the predicates R k . Given distinct elements a 1 ; : : :; a n from A, not all of them are from among the c i and so we can effectively find an s and indeed the smallest s such that one of them is not in P s . We then let R k (a 1 ; : : : ; a n ) The following theorem answers the two specific questions asked. All other instances of the general question are open.
Theorem 5.5 (Khoussainov, Nies and Shore [1997] ) There are @ 1 -categorical but not @ 0 -categorical theories T 1 and T 2 such that i)All models of T 1 except the prime one are computably presentable.
ii)All models of T 2 except the saturated one are computably presentable.
Proof (For T 1 ). Given S ! we construct a structure A S of signature L = (P 0 ; P 1 ; P 2 ; : : :), where each P i is a binary predicate symbol having the following properties:
The theory T S of the structure A S is @ 1 -but not @ 0 -categorical and A S is the prime model of T S . Each nonprime model A of T S has a computable presentation if and only if S is 0 2 .
A computable prime model provides S with a certain recursion-theoretic property but there exists a 0 2 -set which does not have this property.
The building blocks of our structures A S will be finite structures that we call n-cubes and now define by induction on n.
Definition 5.6 A 1-cube C 1 is a structure (fa; bg; P 0 ) such that P 0 (x; y) holds in C 1 if and only if (x = a and y = b) or (y = a and x = b). Given two disjoint n-cubes we get an n + 1-cube as an expansion of their union by letting P n be an isomorphism between the n-cubes. An !-cube is an increasing union of n-cubes, n 2 ! with signature (P 0 ; P 1 ; P 2 ; : : :) Definition 5.7 If S !, A S is the disjoint union of n-cubes for n 2 S and T S = Th(A S ). 
Proof.
It is easy to see that the model A S satisfies the following conditions which are all expressible by a set of axioms in the language L:
1. 8x9yP 0 (x; y) and for each n, P n defines a partial one-to-one function. (We abuse notation by also denoting this partial function by P n .)
2. For all n 6 = m and for all x, P n (x) 6 = P m (x).
3. For each n and for all x if P n (x) is defined, then P 0 (x), P 1 (x), : : :, P n?1 (x) are also defined.
4. For all n; m and for all x if P n (x) and P m (P n (x)) are defined, then P m (P n (x)) = P n (P m (x)).
5. For all k, n > n 1 n 2 : : : n k?1 n k , 8x(P n 1 (: : : (P n k (x) : : :) 6 = P n (x)). 6. For each n 2 !, n 2 S if and only if there exists exactly one n-cube which is not contained in an n + 1-cube.
Let M be a model which satisfies all the above statements. For each n 2 S, M must have an n-cube which is not contained in an n + 1-cube. If an x 2 M does not belong to any n-cube for n 2 S, then x is in an !-cube. Thus any two models which satisfy this list of axioms are isomorphic if and only if they have the same number of !-cubes. In particular, if M 1 and M 2 are models of T S of cardinality @ 1 , each has @ 1 many !-cubes (as each cube is countable). Thus M 1 and M 2 are isomorphic and T S is an @ 1 -but not @ 0 -categorical theory. It is clear that the prime model is the one with no !-cubes.
Lemma 5.9 Each nonprime model of T S is computably presentable if and only if
S is 0 2 .
Proof.
If M is a model of T S , s 2 S if and only if M j = 9x9y8z(P s (x; y)& :P s+1 (x; z)). Thus if M is computably presentable S is 0 2 . For the other direction, note that it suffices to construct a computable model M 1 with one !-cube when S 2 0 2 . (We can computably add on more !-cubes as desired.) We build M by putting in an n-cube when, according to the 0 2 representation of S as fnj9x8yH(x;y;n)g, we seem to have a witness x that n 2 S. When the witness fails, we merge this n-cube into the !-cube that we are building. More formally, at stage 0 we start to build a substructure B that will be an m-cube for some m at every stage s and will at the end of the construction be an !-cube. At stage s;
we first put into M an n-cube for each n < s for which we do not have one and associate the cube with the first number x that has not yet been associated with n. Then, we merge B and the existing n-cubes for those n < s for which there is a y < s such that H(x; y; n) fails for the x currently associated with n into an m-cube for some m larger than any number yet used in the construction. Clearly the substructure B becomes the only !-cube of M. Moreover, for n 2 !, there is an n-cube in the final structure M if and only if 9x8yH(x;y;n), i.e. if and only if n 2 S as required.
We now provide the recursion theoretic property of S that is guaranteed by the existence of a computable prime model of T S (but not by any of the other models being computably presentable). Proof. Suppose M is a computable prime model of T S . Define (x; s) for each x 2 M and s 2 N as the largest n < s such that P n (x; y) holds for some y < s. It is clear that (x; s) is monotonic in s. As every x 2 M is in an n-cube for some n, (x; s) is equal to this n for all sufficiently large s. Proof. Let e (x; t) be a list of all candidates for representations of limitwise monotonic functions f e . At stage s we define a finite set A s so that A(y) = lim s A s (y) exists for all y (and hence A is 0 2 ). We also satisfy the following requirements to guarantee that A is not the range of a limitwise monotonic function.
R e : If f e (x) = lim t e (x; t) < ! for all x, then range(f e ) 6 = A.
The strategy to satisfy a single R e works as follows: At stage s, pick a witness m e , enumerate m e into A (i.e. set A s (m e ) = 1). Now R e is satisfied (since m e remains in A) unless at some later stage t 0 we find an x such that e (x; t 0 ) = m e .
If so, R e ensures that A( e (x; t)) = 0 for all t t 0 . Thus, either f e (x) " or f e (x) # and f e (x) = 2 A.
Keeping e (x; t) out of A for all t t 0 can conflict with a lower priority (i > e) requirement R i since it maybe the case that m i = e (x; t 0 ) for some t 0 > t 0 . However, if f e (x) #, then from some point on there is only one number that R e prevents from being a candidate for m i . If f e (x) ", then the restriction is transitory, i.e. as e (x; t) is monotonic in t each candidate for m i is eventually released and never prevented from being chosen as the final value of m i .Thus each lower priority R i will eventually be able to choose a witness m i that it will never have to change because of the actions of R e : In this way, every requirement can be satisfied by a typical finite injury priority argument.
Proof sketch (For T 2 ). We take a 0 2 set S defined by k 2 S , 8n9mH(n;m;k) which is not 0 2 . (H is some computable predicate on N 3 .) We now code S into a computable structure A with unary predicates P i and predicates R k;s of arity k for i; k; s 2 N. The relevant properties of A that can be guaranteed by axioms in this language are as follows:
The P A i form a descending chain of sets with one element dropping out at each i.
The R A k;s code the approximation H(n; m; k) to k 2 S by requiring that if j is least such that 8n s9m j(H(n; m; k)) and x 1 ; : : :; x k 2 P j are distinct for i k then R k;s (x 1 ; : : :; x k ) holds and not otherwise. (In particular, if k = 2 S then for some s 0 we have axioms saying that R k;s (x 1 ; : : :; x k ) does not hold for any s s 0 and any x 1 ; : : :; x k .)
The theory T S of A S is @ 1 -but not @ 0 -categorical with the dimension of a model A being once again determined by the cardinality of \P A i . The intuition is that the more elements there are in \P A i for a model A of T S , the more of the 0 2 -approximation to S that we can "recover" from the diagram of A. In particular, if A is the saturated model of T S , \P A i is infinite and S is 2 in A: k 2 S , 9x 1 ; : : : x k 2 A (8i)(A j = P i (x 1 )^: : : P i (x k ) )^(8s)(A j = R k;s (x 1 ; : : :x k ))].
As S is not 0 2 , the saturated model of T S is not computably presentable. For each t < !, however, we can (nonuniformly) build a computable model A t of T S with t many elements in \P At i . The information needed is S \ (t + 1) and, for each k t which is not in S the least n for which there is no m such that H(n; m; k)
holds.
All the theorems in this subsection about computable models of @ 1 -categorical theories use infinite signatures. Not too much is known about the existence of such structures and theories in finite signatures or for ones that are extensions of standard algebraic theories. One interesting example is Herwig, Lempp and Ziegler [1999] who have established Theorem 5.3 for n = 0 with T an extension of the theory of groups in the standard signature.
Computable Dimension and Categoricity
Until now we have taken the classical approach of identifying models up to classical isomorphism. However, it is not obvious that even two computable (or decidable) models that happen to be isomorphic should be identified when one is interested in effective procedures. There could well be (and indeed, as we shall Note that in a computably categorical structure A every definable relation that is computable in any presentation of A is computable in every presentation of A and so for such structures the effectiveness of definable properties is independent of the presentation.
Example 6.4 Q (the rationals) with its usual linear order is computably categorical: The standard back and forth argument showing that the theory of dense linear orderings without endpoints is countably categorical is effective and so produces computable isomorphisms between any two such orderings.
Example 6.5 N as a model or PA or indeed as a structure with only the successor function s(x) (given as x + 1 in the language of arithmetic) is computably categorical: Given any B isomorphic to N, one defines the required computable f : N ! B by recursion. f(0) is the first element of B and if f(n) is defined as b 2 B then f(n + 1) = s B (b). However, it is easy to see from Proposition 6.1 that hN; i is not computably categorical. (If s is the successor function on N and f : N !A were a computable isomorphism into the A of Proposition 6.1, fsf ?1 would be a computable successor function on A.) Example 6.6 Every finitely generated structure is computably categorical by the natural generalization of the preceding argument for hN;si. Example 6.7 Q, the algebraic closure of the rationals and so the prime model of ACF 0 , is computably categorical but e Q, the countable saturated model of ACF 0 (i.e. the algebraic closure of the rationals extended by infinitely many transcendentals) has computable dimension ! (Corollary 6.12).
All of these examples have dimension 1 or ! but, actually, every n ! is possible.
Theorem 6.8 (Goncharov [1980a] ) For each n, 1 n ! there is a structure of dimension n.
Goncharov uses a priority argument to construct families of uniformly computably enumerable sets with (in a precise sense) exactly n many distinct enumerations and then codes them into structures so as preserve the dimension. We will see other approaches to these results in Theorem 6.22 and Corollary 7.16. Although there are interesting codings of these families into familiar types of mathematics structures such as groups and rings (see §9), we do not know of any "natural" structures with dimension n for 1 < n < !. Indeed, for many classes of structures it is possible to prove that they are computably categorical or have dimension !.
In most of these cases it is actually possible to characterize the structures that are computably categorical.
Theorem 6.9 , LaRoche [1977] , Remmel [1981] , Goncharov and Dzgoev [1980] 
) A Boolean algebra is computably categorical if it has finitely many atoms. If not, it has dimension !.
Theorem 6.10 (Remmel [1981a] , Goncharov and Dzgoev [1980] 
) A linear order is computably categorical if it has only finitely many pairs of adjacent elements. If not, it has dimension !.
We can deduce a similar result on algebraically closed fields from a general theorem about computable categoricity among decidable presentations of a structure.
Theorem 6.11 (Nurtazin [1974] An important program is thus to characterize or at least classify computably categorical structures and theories whose models are computably categorical. One major success along these lines is the characterization by Goncharov [1975] of computably categorical structures whose two quantifier theory is decidable in terms of Scott families.
Definition 6.13 A Scott family for a structure A is a computable sequence 0 ( a; x 1 ; : : :; x n 0 ); 1 ( a; x 1 ; : : :; x n 1 ); : : :; of 9-formulas, i.e. prenex ones with only existential quantifiers, satisfiable in A, where a is a finite tuple of elements from A, such that every n-tuple of elements from A satisfies one these formulas and any two tuples satisfying the same formula from the above sequence can be interchanged by an automorphism of A. Definition 6.14 A structure A is n-decidable (for n 2 N) if the set of prenex sentences of Th(A; a) a2A with n?1 alternations of quantifiers is computable. So, for example, A is 1-decidable if the set of prenex sentences of Th(A; a) a2A with either only existential or only universal quantifiers is decidable.
Proposition 6.15 If a structure A has a Scott family, then A is computably categorical.
Proof. Let 0 ( a; x 1 ; : : : ; x n 0 ); 1 ( a; x 1 ; : : : ; x n 1 ); : : : be a Scott family for A, where a = (a 0 ; : : :; a m?1 ). Let A 1 and A 2 be computable presentations of A. We define a mapping f : A 1 ! A 2 by stages. We can assume that for each j 2 f0;:::;m ? 1g, a i j is the element in A i corresponding to the constant a j . At even stages we define images of elements from A 1 , at odd stages we define preimages of elements from A 2 .
Stage 0. Set f 0 = f(a 1 0 ; a 2 0 ); : : : ; (a 1 m?1 ; a 2 m?1 )g. Note that the definition of computable categoricity is on its face a 1 1 property. This theorem gives a 1 1 equivalent (having a Scott family). Actually, the property of having a Scott family can easily be seen to be arithmetic as the requirement for an isomorphism can be replaced by the existence of a set of finite partial isomorphisms with the back and forth property. Thus, for 2-decidable structures, Theorem 6.16 gives a characterization that is significantly simpler than the underlying definition of computable categoricity. We now turn to the specific issue of persistence of computable categoricity under expansions by constants that will turn out to be a route into various results and examples of the sorts listed above. In particular, it will lead us to a proof that the existence of a Scott family is not necessary for computable categoricity.
Persistence of Computable Categoricity
Classically, it is an easy consequence of the Ryll-Nardzewski Theorem that having a countably categorical theory is persistent, i.e. preserved under expansions by finitely many constants.
Theorem 6.17 If Th(A), the theory of a structure A, is countably categorical then so is the theory of any expansion of A by finitely many constants.
The natural question for computable categoricity has been considered by Millar, Goncharov and others. It is posed as the Millar-Goncharov problem in Ershov and Goncharov [1986] : Question 6.18 (Millar,Goncharov) Is computable categoricity persistent, i.e. if
A is computably categorical is also every expansion of A by finitely many constants?
It is not hard to see that if a structure A has a Scott family i ( a; x 1 ; : : :; x n i ) then every expansion by finitely many constants c 1 ; : : : c m also has one. We simply slightly modify the original Scott family. (Essentially, one replaces each formula i ( a; x 1 ; : : : ; x n i ) by i ( a; c 1 ; : : :; c m ; x 1 ; : : :x n i ?m ) and then lists only the satisfied formulas. Then, one can easily check that the sequence 0 ; 1 ; : : : is a Scott family for the expanded structure (A; c 1 ; : : : ; c m ).) Thus Theorem 6.16 gives us an answer when A is 2-decidable. Corollary 6.19 (Goncharov [1975] ) If A is 2-decidable then the expansion of A by finitely many constants is also computably categorical.
Millar has improved this result by one quantifier by a quite different proof. So, roughly speaking, it suffices to be able to solve systems of equalities and inequalities.
Theorem 6.20 (Millar [1986] ) If A is 1-decidable then the expansion of A by finitely many constants is also computably categorical.
Proof (Hirschfeldt) . Suppose we are given A and B isomorphic, computably categorical and 1-decidable with hA;ai = hB;bi. We will build C via a Henkin construction, a sequence g s of partial isomorphisms from C to B and, for each potential isomorphism e : C ! A, a partial map h e : C ! B such that either there is an e such that h e is total and h e ?1 e is an isomorphism from hA;ai to hB;bi, or g = lim s g s exists and is an isomorphism from C to B but no e is an isomorphism from C to A. As the second alternative contradicts the hypothesis that A is computably categorical, we will have the desired computable isomorphism between hA;ai and hB;bi. In the construction we actually act, when we can, to guarantee that e is not an isomorphism from C to A (and so we do not have to worry about it). Thus we let R e be the requirement that e is not an isomorphism from C to A. As the construction proceeds, we say that R e is satisfied (or not) depending on whether we have a certain type of witness to e 's not being an isomorphism from C to A.
For convenience, we assume that the domain of each model considered here is N. Let f n g n2! be an effective list of all atomic sentences in the language of A expanded by adding a constant i for each i 2 !. By 0 n and 1 n we mean : n and n , respectively.
For any conjunction ? of literals containing no constant i for i > m and partial computable function with computable domain, we let f(k) = n if (k) #= n, f(k) = x k if (k) ", and denote by ? ] the formula 9x 0 9x m ?(0=f(0); : : : : : : ; m=f(m)). So, for example, if n is the sentence P(0; 1;2;3) and = fh1;7i;h3;5ig, then 1 n ] = 9x 0 9x 1 9x 2 9x 3 P(x 0 ; 7;x 2 ; 5), while, on the other hand, 0 n ] = 9x 0 9x 1 9x 2 9x 3 :P(x 0 ; 7;x 2 ; 5).
We note a few immediate consequences of this definition. In what follows, " will always be either 0 or 1. If 1 or 3 holds we must abandon the current attempt at the isomorphism h and so let h e;s+1 = ?. If 1 holds, we have a witness to fact that e is not an isomorphism from C to A and we declare R e to be satisfied.
If 2 holds, there are two cases. If h e;s = ?, we restart our definition of h e using the assumed isomorphism between hA;ai and hB;bi: Find the least tuple ha 0 ; : : :; a r?1 i of distinct numbers such that a ze;s = b and if we define h e;s+1 to be the partial function mapping each n < r to a n , then Verifications. Since at each stage s + 1 we added either s or its negation to C , C is the atomic diagram of a structure C. Because A and B are 1-decidable, the construction is effective and so C is computable.
Suppose first that there is an e such that R e is active infinitely often and let e be the least such number. We wish to show that h e ?1 e is the desired computable isomorphism from hA;ai to hB;bi. Let s 0 be a stage such that no R i is active for i < e at any stage t s 0 . It follows from the definition of r e;s that there exists an s 1 s 0 such that r e;t = r e;s 1 for all t s 1 . Let r e = r e;s 1 . It follows from the definition of g s that there exists s 2 s 1 such that g t r e + 1 = g s 2 r e + 1 for all t s 2 . As R e is active infinitely often it is never satisfied after stage s 2 . So condition 1 never holds after this stage. Thus A ? s e ] for every s s 2 , and hence e is an isomorphism from C to A.
We claim that it is not possible for condition 3 to hold infinitely often. Suppose otherwise. Let s 3 s 2 be such that dom e;s 3 f0;:::;r e g. Inspecting the way h e;s+1 is defined when case 2 holds and h e;s = ?, we see that there is an s s 3 such that h e;s+1 = fhn;a n i j n r e g for a tuple ha 0 ; : : : ; a re i, a ze;s = b, such that for all t > s, 1. B ? t+1 fhn;a n i j n r e g] and 2. B (? t^ 1?" t ) fhn;a n i j n r e g] ) A (? t^ 1?" t ) e r e + 1].
Such a tuple exists because hA;ai = hB;bi and e (z e;s ) = a. But then " u must be in ? u+1 , so that A 2 ? u+1 , contrary to our assumption.
So condition 3 holds only finitely often. Say it never holds after stage s 4 s 3 . Since condition 2 holds infinitely often, there are infinitely many e-expansionary stages. Thus, since R e is never satisfied, e is a computable isomorphism from C to A. Furthermore, h e = lim s h e;s is well-defined, and in fact h e (x) = h e;s (x) for the least s > s 4 for which h e;s (x) is defined. Since B ? s h e;s ] for all s > s 4 , h e is a computable isomorphism from C to B.
Thus h e ?1 e is a computable isomorphism from A to B. But if we let z = lim s z e;s , then h e ?1 e (a) = h e (z) = b. Thus in fact h e ?1 e is the desired computable isomorphism from hA;ai to hB;bi.
Finally, suppose for the sake of a contradiction that every e is active only finitely often. It is not hard to see that at any e-expansionary stage, one of conditions 1, 2, or 3 must hold. Thus, if there are infinitely many e-expansionary stages then R e is eventually permanently satisfied.
As we have mentioned, if s is a stage such that, for each i < e and each t s, R i is not active at stage t and r e;t = r e;s , then for all t s, g t r e;s + 1 = g s r e;s +1 and B ? t g t r e;s +1]. So the fact that each e is active only finitely often implies that g = lim t g t exists and is an isomorphism from C to B.
Thus C is isomorphic, but not computably isomorphic, to A, contradicting the computable categoricity of A.
Thus 1-decidability suffices to guarantee the persistence of computable categoricity. We will see in the next section that, without such an assumption, computable categoricity need not be persistent. Moreover, the equivalence of computable categoricity with having a Scott family established by Goncharov under the assumption of 2-decidability does not hold for all 1-decidable structures (Theorem 7.19).
Nonpersistence of Computable Categoricity
We now see that the addition of even a single constant for any element of a computably categorical structure can change its dimension.
Theorem 6.22 (Cholak, Goncharov, Khoussainov and Shore [1999] ) For each k 2 ! there is a computably categorical A such that the expansion A 0 of A gotten by adding on a constant naming any element of A has dimension exactly k.
Idea of Proof (for k = 2). We first construct a (uniformly) computably enumerable family of distinct pairs of sets S = ff(i)ji 2 !g = f(A i ; B i )ji 2 !g which is symmetric, i.e. for every i 2 ! there is a j 2 ! such that f(i) = (A i ; B i ) = (B j ; A j ). In addition to the computable enumeration f, there is one other natural computable enumeration of this family,f defined byf(i) = (B i ; A i ). This family S is constructed (by a 0 00 type priority argument) to have dimension 2 in the sense that there is no computable function g such that f =fg but, for every one-one computable enumeration h of the family, there is a computable function g such that f = hg orf = hg. The two enumerations of this family are then coded symmetrically into a graph so that the whole structure is computably categorical. If one adds on a constant, however, it distinguishes between the two coded enumerations and so one has a structure of dimension 2.
For _ k > 2, one can generalize the notion of symmetric family to one-one enumerations f of families S of k-tuples of sets. The combinatorial details become fairly complicated. A simpler approach to a proof of the general theorem is provided in the next section as a corollary to some results on degree spectra.
Degree Spectra of Relations
Another important topic in computable model theory that turns out to be closely connected to computable categoricity is that of the dependence of the computability properties of relations not included in the language of a given structure on its presentation. For example, in "standard" presentations of hN; i the successor function is computable but it is not computable in every presentation (Proposition 6.1). Similarly, standard presentations of the algebraically closed field e Q of characteristic 0 and infinite transcendence degree make the relation of algebraic dependence computable but not all presentations do. (Indeed, if algebraic dependence is computable in both of two isomorphic computable algebraically closed fields then they are computably isomorphic. However, Corollary 6.12 says that if they have infinite transcendence degree their dimension is infinite.) On the other hand, these particular relations are easily seen to always be co-computably enumerable and computably enumerable respectively. Others remain computable or computably enumerable in every presentation. Such relations were singled out and studied by Ash and Nerode [1981] . We know that the two structures discussed above, hN; i and e Q, are not computably categorical while similar ones (such as hN;si and algebraically closed extension of Q of finite transcendence degree) are computably categorical and in each of them this phenomena (of a relation being computable in one presentation and not in another) does not arise. One might naturally ask if computable categoricity guarantees that a relation computable in one presentation is computable in all. The answer is both yes and no. If we restrict our attention to relations that are definable or even invariant under all automorphisms the answer is yes.
Proposition 7.4 If a structure A is computably categorical then every definable relation R (or one invariant under automorphisms) on A that is computable in any presentation of A is intrinsically computable, i.e. computable in every presentation of A.
Proof. Suppose A is computably categorical, R A is computable, and g is an isomorphism from A to B. We wish to show that g R A ] is computable. As A is computably categorical, there is a computable isomorphism f : A ! B. R A and
R
A are computable and so their images under f are computably enumerable and complementary and hence computable. As R is invariant under automorphisms, in particular under g ?1 f, f R A ] = g R A ] and so g R A ] is also computable.
So for computably categorical structures the effectiveness of definable properties is independent of the presentation. If we ask instead that every computable relation on A (definable or not) be intrinsically computable, the answer to our question is no. Computable categoricity does not suffice to guarantee that every computable relation is intrinsically computable. (See Example 7.7 below.) Instead we are led to a stronger notion. Definition 7.5 A is computably stable if every isomorphism f : A ! B is computable.
Example 7.6 hN;si is computably stable. Indeed, every isomorphism between two presentations is uniquely determined by the computable procedure of sending the least element in one presentation to the least one in the other and then proceeding by recursion as in Example 6.5.
Example 7.7 hQ; i is computably categorical but not computably stable. In fact, given any two presentations of hQ; i, the usual back and forth argument shows that there are continuum many isomorphisms between them. Moreover, the usual back and forth argument can be run in each of countably many intervals to, for example, construct an automorphism taking a computable subset (such as Z) to a noncomputable one (any set consisting of one element from each interval (x; x + 1) for x 2 Z).
Proposition 7.8 (Ash and Nerode [1981] ) A is computably stable if and only if every computable relation on A is intrinsically computable. Proof. As every isomorphism between presentations of A is computable, the argument of Proposition 7.4 shows that the image of any computable relation R on A under any isomorphism is computable. For the other (if) direction, consider A as a structure on the set N and the relation R giving, in A, the successor function on N. If f : A ! B is an isomorphism and R B = f R A ] is computable then the construction of Example 6.5 computes f.
One can, in fact, give a more informative characterization of computable stability like that provided for computable categoricity in terms of Scott families by Theorem 6.16. In place of a sequence of formulas each of which determines a sequence of elements of the given structure A up to automorphisms, one needs a sequence of formulas that uniquely define the elements of A. On the other hand, we now only need the 1-decidability of A for the characterization. Theorem 7.9 (Ash and Nerode [1981] , Goncharov [1975] Proof sketch. It is easy to see that the existence of a family as described insures that every isomorphism f : A ! B is computable as, once the image of the constants c are fixed, f must send the unique solution of each i (c; x) in A to the solution of the same formula in B. The proof of the other direction (only if) of this theorem involves a finite injury priority argument. One attempts to build a B isomorphic to the given A by a 2 isomorphism but not by any computable isomorphism. The least failure of this diagonalization requirement occurs only because the elements on which we might diagonalize are uniquely defined from those fixed by higher priority requirements. These already fixed elements are the constants c required. The portions of the diagram of B to which we have committed ourselves at various stages of the construction provide the desired formulas i when various extra parameters are replaced by existentially quantified variables.
More generally, we would like to know when a specified computable (or computably enumerable) relation is intrinsically computable or computably enumerable. An examination of the two examples considered above, hN; i and e Q, gives us a clue as to when a relation is intrinsically c.e. The relation P(x; y) on N saying that y is not the immediate successor of x is definable in the structure hN; i by the existential formula 9z((x < z < y)_(y < z < x)_(x = y)) and so is computably enumerable in any presentation of hN; i. The binary relation D(x; y) saying that x and y are algebraically dependent is equivalent to the disjunction of an infinite computable list of existential formulas n each asserting (in the language of fields) that there is a nonzero polynomial of degree n in x and y which equals 0. Any such relation is again clearly computably enumerable in any presentation of a field. To enumerate the dependent pairs, one simply dovetails the searches for witnesses for each of the existential formulas n . These phenomena suggest a definition.
Definition 7.10 A relation R(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) on a structure A is formally computably enumerable if it is equivalent to a disjunction W i (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) of a computable sequence of existential formulas i with free variables x 1 ; : : :; x n . R is formally computable if both R and R are formally computably enumerable.
Clearly, any formally computable (computably enumerable) relation is intrinsically computable (computably enumerable). Ash and Nerode [1981] prove that, under mild decidability conditions, this condition is also necessary. (Ash and Nerode [1981] ) If R A n and hA;Ri is 1-decidable,
Theorem 7.11
then R is intrinsically computably enumerable if and only if it is formally computably enumerable. R is intrinsically computable if and only if it is formally computable.
Actually, the 1-decidability of hA;Ri is a bit stronger than what Ash and Nerode need. They only need to be able to decide for each c in A and each existential (c; x) if there is an a = 2 R such that A j = (c; a). However, some conditions are necessary as Goncharov [1980a] and Manasse [1982] have constructed examples of intrinsically c.e. relations which are not formally c.e. There has been a lot of work, primarily by Ash, Ash and Knight and their students generalizing these results (under stronger decidability conditions) to syntactic characterizations of relations being intrinsically or for all levels of the hyperarithmetic hierarchy. They also provide similar generalizations of the notions and results on computable categoricity and stability to higher levels of the hierarchy of computable infinitary formulas. These papers include Ash [1986 Ash [ ], [1986a , [1987] ; Ash and Knight [1990] , [1994] , [1995] , Barker [1988] and Chisholm [1990a] . Related results when the notions are relativized to the degree of noncomputable models can be found in Ash, Knight, Manasse and Slaman [1989] , Ash, Knight and Slaman [1993] and Chisholm [1990] . Here the results are proven by forcing arguments and the extra decidability hypotheses are not needed. Definition 7.12 If R A n is an n-ary relation on A, the degree spectrum of R, DgSp(R), is fdeg T (f R]) jf : A ! B is an isomorphismg.
There are a number of results giving conditions under which the degree spectrum of a computable relation consists of precisely some particular standard class of degrees such as all the degrees, the c.e. degrees, etc. We concentrate on the issue of finding instances where the spectrum is finite and the connections between this issue and the dimension of the given structure. The first results of this sort are due to Harizanov. Here is one example.
Theorem 7.13 (Harizanov [1993] We sketch the proof of this theorem in §9. For now we give some generalizations and corollaries.
Theorem 7.15 (Khoussainov and Shore [1998] Proof. Take the structure A given by Theorem 7.15 for the partial order consisting of k many incomparable elements. Let A i , 1 i k be the computable representatives of the computable isomorphism types of A. So, in particular the sets R A i are Turing incomparable. We use the computability of P to paste the A i together to produce a B as required. More precisely, B consists of the disjoint union of the A i and the edges of B are the ones in each A i . In addition, B has an extra binary predicate defined by the relation P in the theorem and an equivalence relation E whose equivalence classes are the A i .
Clearly B is a computable structure. Now let B 0 be any computable presentation of B. Let A 0 1 and A 0 2 be two equivalence classes in B 0 . These two substructures of B 0 considered as graphs are isomorphic to A. Hence A 0 1 is computably isomorphic to one of A 1 , : : :, A k . Without loss of generality suppose that A 0 1 is computably isomorphic to A 1 via a computable function f 1 : A 1 ! A 0 1 . If A 0 2 were computably isomorphic to A 1 via a computable function f 2 : A 1 ! A 0 2 , then we would be able to decide R A 1 in A 1 as follows: x in A 1 belongs to R A 1 if and only if (f 1 (x); f 2 (x)) 2 P. Hence all the structures A 0 1 , : : :, A 0 k are pairwise noncomputably isomorphic and so represent all the computable isomorphism types of A, i.e. are computably isomorphic to A 1 ; : : :; A k (in some order). Hence B 0 is clearly computably isomorphic to B and so B is computably categorical. Now let a be any element from A 1 . Consider the expanded structures B i consisting of B with the new constant interpreted as a i , the image of a in A i . It is clear that all the B i are isomorphic but not computably so. Thus the dimension of B i is at least k. On the other hand, as A is rigid there are no choices other than the a i as the interpretation of a in B. Thus, by the computable categoricity of B, any structure isomorphic to say B 1 must be computably isomorphic to one of the B i and so the dimension of these structures is precisely k as required.
Corollary 7.17 (Khoussainov and Shore [1998] ) There exists a computably categorical structure without a Scott family.
Proof. If structure of previous corollary had a Scott family it would remain computably categorical when constants were added.
A similar construction provides an example showing that even if the structure is persistently computably categorical it need not have a Scott family.
Theorem 7.18 (Khoussainov and Shore [1998] (Kudinov [1996] ) There is a computably categorical 1-decidable structure A with no Scott family.
Proof sketch. Kudinov slightly modifies a family of computable enumerations constructed by Selivanov [1976] and then codes the family as a unary algebra in such a way as to produce a computably categorical structure with a decidable existential theory but no Scott family.
Of course, this Theorem shows that the assumption of 2-decidability was necessary in Goncharov's characterization (Theorem 6.16) of computably categorical structures as ones with Scott families. By Millar's result on persistence (Theorem 6.20), Kudinov's structure is persistently computably categorical and so is also a witness to Theorem 7.18.
A very natural question is whether every c.e. degree can be realized (with 0) as a degree spectrum. Hirschfeldt has recently answered this question by adapting and extending the methods presented here.
Theorem 7.20 (Hirschfeldt [1999] (Goncharov and Khoussainov [1997] ) Which n-tuples of c.e. degrees can be realized as the degree spectrum of a relation on a structure of dimension n?
If we move beyond the c.e. degrees there are a few results by Harizanov on possible degree spectra but not much is known. However, we should point out that several natural strengthenings of these results can ruled out by classical descriptive set theoretic results. 
Remark 1
Algebraic Examples
In §6 we saw several examples of theories whose models all have dimension 1 or ! and algebraic conditions characterizing the models in each class. The theories of this sort considered there were linear orderings, Boolean algebras and algebraically closed fields. We cite two more. 1 or !.
The proof of this result is particularly interesting because it relies on important sufficient condition for a structure to have dimension !.
Theorem 8.3 (Goncharov [1982] ) If there is a 0 2 isomorphism between A and B but no computable one then A has dimension !.
On the other hand, the results described in §6.2 and §7, as well as many earlier papers, supply examples of structures of dimension n for each n 2 !. Indeed, our results supply examples of structures of dimension n whose presentations are characterized by the Turing degree of a specific relation on the structure. Moreover, representatives of the n many computable isomorphism types of these structures can be pasted together to produce a single computably categorical structure such that an expansion by constants yields a structure of dimension n. Of course, when there are characterization theorems that show that the dimension must be 1 or ! such constructions are not possible. On the other hand, for many familiar algebraic theories for which we cannot provide such a dichotomy and characterization, it is possible to construct examples of models not only of each finite dimension but also ones exhibiting the additional properties enjoyed by the examples in §7.
Theorem 8.4 (Goncharov [1980a] , [1981] ; Goncharov and Dobrotun [1989] , Goncharov, Molokov and Romanovski [1989] ; Kudinov (personal communication) ; Hirschfeldt, Khoussainov, Slinko and Shore [1999] The results on the existence of models of each of these theories of each finite dimension are due to various people (most to Goncharov and his coauthors, the one for integral domains is due to Kudinov). They were typically first proved by codings of families of c.e. sets. For graphs, the results involving degree spectra and extensions by constants are due to Khoussainov and Shore and are described in §7. (Actually, the original paper used directed graphs but an examination of the construction shows that it is possible to use undirected graphs instead.) All the other ones involving degree spectra and extensions by constants have been proven by Hirschfeldt, Khoussainov, Slinko and Shore [1999] .
Although direct constructions are sometimes possible, these results can all be derived from the results on graphs by finding a sufficiently effective coding of graphs into models of each theory. The idea is that, if the coding is sufficiently effective, all the computability properties involved carry over. Thus all these theories are not only undecidable but the codings (of say graphs) needed to prove that they are universal (i.e. code all of predicate logic) are highly effective. (In addition to simple codings of the domain and edge relation on the initial graph, an important issue is the effective reversibility of the coding. That is, one wants the model coding a given graph to effectively determine the original graph.) On the other hand, the theories discussed in §6 whose models are all either computably categorical or of dimension ! are decidable and have strong structure theorems that are used in the proofs. We expect that there are natural theories that are neither "so decidable" as those of §6 nor "so undecidable" as the ones in Theorem 8.4. In particular, we suggest the theory of fields as a good test case as it is undecidable but the proofs of undecidability (that we know) interpret N in a rather specific way rather than arbitrary structures.
9.
The Basic Theorem on Degree Spectra
In this section we sketch the proof of the Theorem 7.14, the case n = 2 of our main theorem on degree spectra.
Theorem 7.14 (Khoussainov and Shore [1998] R 0 is computably enumerable but not computable: As the construction proceeds we enumerate the elements x of R 0 so as to make the set enumerated noncomputable by a standard diagonalization procedure. R 1 is computable: As we enumerate a number x into R 0 , we make sure that the corresponding element y of A 1 is a new large number. Thus R 1 is enumerated in increasing order. P = fhx;yijx 2 R 0^y 2 R 1^( 9f : A 0 = A 1 )(f(x) = y)g is computable:
By the procedure alluded to above for choosing the y 2 R 1 corresponding to a given x 2 R 0 , the pairs hx;yi 2 P are enumerated in increasing order. A 0 c A 1 : This is guaranteed by the previous requirements that R 0 is computable but R 1 is not. By the rigidity of A, there is only one isomorphism from A 0 to A 1 and it must take R 0 to R 1 . If it were computable it would preserve the computability of the interpretation of R.
Every computable presentation G j of A is computably isomorphic to A 0 or A 1 :
Our plan here is to define maps r j;s so that at every stage s of the construction at which it still looks as if G j might be isomorphic to A, r j;s is a monomorphism from G j;s into A i;s (for i = 0 or 1) and that, at the end of stage s, if we cannot extend the current map r j;s then we switch so that r j;s+1 is a monomorphism from G j;s+1 into A 1?i;s+1 . If, after some stage t, we never switch our potential isomorphism then fr j;s jt sg is, in fact, the desired computable isomorphism from G j to A i . On the other hand, if we switch infinitely often we guarantee that there is a special component S j of G j which is not a component of A and so G j is not isomorphic to A.
The crucial idea needed for the construction is how to diagonalize to make R 0 noncomputable while its isomorphic image R 1 remains computable and also maintain control over the potential isomorphisms between G j and A i . The diagonalization procedure is based on two symmetric operations L (left) and R (right) on sequences of graphs B i ]. ] (with 1 for n + 1 when i = n). This convention is important for establishing computability properties of the graphs being constructed.
We will apply an R operation in the construction (to A 1 ) only when we also apply an L one (to A 0 ). We also have the corresponding convention that the ele- The plan for diagonalization is now easily described. To make sure that R 0 6 = e , we choose numbers a e ; b e and c e and insert copies of a e ]; b e ] and c e ] into A 0 and A 1 . For definiteness, say that x e is the (number which is) the coding location for a e in these graphs. We now wait for e (x e ) to converge to 0. If it never does we do nothing and so win as x e is not in R 0 . If e (x e ) converges to 0 at stage s, Here P e and Q e are either numbers chosen in advance for the requirement for G or sets that have participated in one of these two locations in a previous operation for G. In any case, all of these components are in the range of r s when we perform the operations. Suppose r s mapped G into A i . The crucial point is that when we next get an expansionary stage at t and it is possible to extend r s so as to keep S] mapped into S i;s ] then it is possible to extend r s to be a map of G into A i at t.
The key idea here is that each component in the original sequence can "grow into" only one of two components in the final one, itself or the one immediately to its left (or right depending on whether i = 0 or 1). Thus if the image of one of the components remains fixed then we can see (in the reverse order of the operation performed) that each component in turn remains fixed as it has no other place to go. In this case, we extend r s to r t still mapping G into A i . If it is not possible to keep S] mapped into S i;s ] then we change r so as to define r t as a map from G into A 1?i . This also means that S i;t ] is not the same component in A i as was S i;s ] (or we could have kept it fixed). (Actually it is the component that had been P e ] or Q e ] depending on the specifics of the situation.) We now guarantee never to use the old S i;s ] component in any future operation.
The ultimate consequence of such a procedure is that, if we change the range of r t infinitely often, S] becomes infinite in G but each component S i;s ] that is a potential image of S] in A i is involved in only finitely many operations and so is itself finite. Thus, in this case, G is not isomorphic to A. On the other hand, if G actually is isomorphic to A, we keep extending r s from some stage on while never changing the A i to which it maps G. In this case, we arrange the definition of r s so that if it eventually maps onto A i and so determines the required computable isomorphism from G to A i .
We have, of course, omitted some of the combinatorics (particularly the way in which we extend the domain of r) even in this case of one G requirement. The
